The task for Labor’s Pacific diplomacy is now to win back the lost ground in the independent sovereign state that Australia helped to found.
The $26 billion sovereign wealth fund that keeps the country running is due to run out in 2030. A compromise on thewhereby Dili would earn 70 per cent of the royalties from gas fields estimated to contain more than $70 billion in revenue – remains in limbo amid the dispute with Woodside Energy over whether the gas should be processed on the Australian or Timor-Leste side of the Timor Sea.
There were not only clear economic danger signs of Dili reaching out to Beijing, but also explicit diplomatic signals. In August last year, President Jose Ramos-Horta, a leading former independence activist, tried to grab Canberra’s attention by declaring that his country might play the “China card”. Yet somehow Canberra missed the warning.
As head of ASEAN, Mr Widodo insisted on Timor-Leste being offered membership of the trade bloc. But Mr Gusmao rejected joining an organisation that had failed to solve the political crisis in Myanmar – a radical chic stance in keeping with his resistance past, but at odds with the interests of young Timorese people seeking jobs and economic development.